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A central tenet of inflation targeting is that establishing and 
maintaining well-anchored inflation expectations are essential. 
Well-anchored expectations enable inflation-targeting central banks to 
achieve stable output and employment in the short run, while ensuring 
price stability in the long run. Three elements of inflation targeting 
have been critically important for the successful implementation 
of this framework.1 First and foremost is the announcement of an 
explicit quantitative inflation target and the acknowledgment that 
low, stable inflation is the primary objective and responsibility of the 
central bank. Second is the clear communication of the central bank’s 
policy strategy and the rationale for its decisions, which enhances the 
predictability of the central bank’s actions and its accountability to 
the public. Third is a forward-looking policy orientation, characterized 
by the vigilant monitoring of inflation expectations at both short-term 
and longer-term horizons. Together, these elements provide a focal 
point for inflation, facilitate the formation of the public’s inflation 
expectations, and provide guidance on actions that may be needed 
to foster price stability.
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1. A number of studies have examined in detail the defining characteristics of 
inflation targeting. See Leiderman and Svensson (1995); Bernanke and Mishkin (1997); 
Bernanke and others (1999); Goodfriend (2004).
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Although inflation-targeting central banks stress these key 
elements, the literature that studies inflation targeting in the 
context of formal models largely describes inflation targeting in 
terms of the solution to an optimization problem within the confines 
of a linear rational expectations model. This approach is limited 
in its appreciation of the special features of the inflation-targeting 
framework, as emphasized by Faust and Henderson (2004), and it 
strips inflation targeting of its raison d’être. In an environment of 
rational expectations with perfect knowledge, for instance, inflation 
expectations are anchored as long as policy satisfies a minimum test 
of stability. Furthermore, with the possible exception of a one-time 
statement of the central bank’s objectives, central bank communication 
loses any independent role because the public already knows all it 
needs in order to form expectations relevant for its decisions. In 
such an environment, the public’s expectations of inflation and 
other variables are characterized by a linear combination of lags of 
observed macroeconomic variables, and, as such, they do not merit 
special monitoring by the central bank or provide useful information 
to the policymaker for guiding policy decisions.
In this paper, we argue that in order to understand the attraction 
of inflation targeting to central bankers and its effectiveness relative to 
other monetary policy strategies, it is essential to recognize economic 
agents’ imperfect understanding of the macroeconomic landscape 
within which the public forms expectations and policymakers 
formulate and implement monetary policy. To this end, we consider two 
modest deviations from the perfect-knowledge rational expectations 
benchmark, and we reexamine the role of the key elements of the 
inflation-targeting framework in the context of an economy with 
imperfect knowledge. We find that including these modifications 
provides a rich framework in which to analyze inflation-targeting 
strategies and their implementation.
The first relaxation of perfect knowledge that we incorporate is to 
recognize that policymakers face uncertainty regarding the evolution 
of key natural rates. In the United States, for example, estimates 
of the natural interest and unemployment rates are remarkably 
imprecise.2 This problem is arguably even more dramatic for small 
2. For discussion and documentation of this imprecision, see Orphanides and 
Williams (2002); Laubach and Williams (2003); Clark and Kozicki (2005). See also 
Orphanides and van Norden (2002) for the related unreliability regarding the 
measurement of the natural rate of output and implied output gap. 
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open economies and transitional economies that have tended to adopt 
inflation targeting. Policymakers’ misperceptions on the evolution 
of natural rates can result in persistent policy errors, hindering 
successful stabilization policy.3
Our second modification is to allow for the presence of imperfections 
in expectations formation that arise when economic agents have 
incomplete knowledge of the economy’s structure. We assume that agents 
rely on an adaptive learning technology to update their beliefs and form 
expectations based on incoming data. Recent research highlights the 
ways in which imperfect knowledge can act as a propagation mechanism 
for macroeconomic disturbances in terms of amplification and persistence 
that have first-order implications for monetary policy.4 Agents may rely 
on a learning technology to guard against numerous potential sources 
of uncertainty. One source could be the evolution of natural rates in the 
economy, paralleling the uncertainty faced by policymakers. Another 
might involve the policymakers’ understanding of the economy, their 
likely response to economic developments, and the precise quantification 
of policy objectives. Recognition of this latter element in the economy 
highlights a role for central bank communications, including that of 
an explicit quantitative inflation target, which would be absent in an 
environment of perfect knowledge.
We investigate the role of inflation targeting in an environment of 
imperfect knowledge using an estimated quarterly model of the U.S. 
economy. Specifically, we compare the performance of the economy 
subject to shocks with characteristics similar to those observed in 
the data over the past four decades under alternative informational 
assumptions and policy strategies. Following McCallum (1988) and 
Taylor (1993), we focus on implementable policy rules that capture the 
key characteristics of inflation targeting. Our analysis shows that some 
monetary policy rules that would perform well under the assumption 
of rational expectations with perfect knowledge perform very poorly 
when we introduce imperfect knowledge. In particular, rules that 
rely on estimates of natural rates for setting policy are susceptible 
to persistent errors. Under certain conditions, these errors can give 
rise to endogenous inflation scares, whereby inflation expectations 
become unmoored from the central bank’s desired anchor. These 
3. For analyses of the implications of misperceptions for policy design, see 
Orphanides and Williams (2002); Orphanides (2003b); Cukierman and Lippi (2005). 
4. See Orphanides and Williams (2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c); Gaspar and Smets 
(2002); Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2005); Milani (2005). 
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results illustrate the potential shortcomings of such standard policy 
rules and the desirability of identifying an alternative monetary policy 
framework when knowledge is imperfect.
We then examine the performance of an easily implemented 
policy rule that incorporates the three key characteristics of 
inflation targeting highlighted above in an economy with imperfect 
knowledge. The exercise reveals that all three play an important 
role in ensuring success. First, central bank transparency, including 
explicit communication of the inflation target, can lessen the burden 
placed on agents to infer central bank intentions and can thereby 
improve macroeconomic performance. Second, policies that do not 
rely on estimates of natural rates are easy to communicate and 
are well designed for ensuring medium-run inflation control when 
natural rates are highly uncertain. Finally, policies that respond to 
the public’s near-term inflation expectations help the central bank 
avoid falling behind the curve in terms of controlling inflation, and 
they result in better stabilization outcomes than policies that rely 
only on past realizations of data and ignore information contained in 
private agents’ expectations.
A reassuring aspect of our analysis is that despite the environment 
of imperfect knowledge and the associated complexity of the economic 
environment, successful policy can be remarkably simple to implement 
and communicate. We find that simple difference rules that do not 
require any knowledge of the economy’s natural rates are particularly 
well suited to ensure medium-run inflation control when natural rates 
are highly uncertain. These rules share commonalities with the simple 
robust strategy first proposed by Wicksell (1936 [1898]), who, after 
defining the natural interest rate, pointed out that precise knowledge 
about it, though desirable, was neither feasible nor necessary for policy 
implementation aimed toward maintaining price stability.
“This does not mean that the bank ought actually to ascertain the 
natural rate before fixing their own rates of interest. That would, 
of course, be impracticable, and would also be quite unnecessary. 
For the current level of commodity prices provides a reliable test of 
the agreement or diversion of the two rates. The procedure should 
rather be simply as follows: So long as prices remain unchanged, the 
bank’s rate of interest is to remain unaltered. If prices rise, the rate 
of interest is to be raised; and if prices fall, the rate of interest is to 
be lowered; and the rate of interest is henceforth to be maintained at 
its new level until a further movement in prices calls for a further 
change in one direction or the other (...)
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In my opinion, the main cause of the instability of prices resides in 
the instability of the banks to follow this rule.”5 
Our analysis confirms that simple difference rules that implicitly 
target the price level in the spirit of Wicksell excel at tethering inflation 
expectations to the central bank’s goal. In so doing, they achieve 
superior stabilization of inflation and economic activity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 
describes the estimated model of the economy. Section 2 lays out the 
model of perpetual learning and its calibration. Section 3 analyzes 
key features of the model under rational expectations and imperfect 
knowledge. Section 4 examines the performance of alternative 
monetary policy strategies, including our implementation of inflation 
targeting. Section 5 concludes.
1. A SIMPLE ESTIMATED MODEL OF THE U.S. ECONOMY
We use a simple estimated quarterly model of the U.S. economy 
from Orphanides and Williams (2002), the core of which consists of 
the following two equations:
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Here π denotes the annualized percent change in the aggregate output 
price deflator, u denotes the unemployment rate, u* denotes the (true) 
natural rate of unemployment, ra denotes the (ex ante) real interest 
rate with one-year maturity, and r* the (true) natural real rate of 
interest. The superscript e denotes the public’s expectations formed 
during t – 1. This model combines forward-looking elements of the new 
synthesis model studied by Goodfriend and King (1997), Rotemberg 
and Woodford (1999), Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), and McCallum 
and Nelson (1999), with intrinsic inflation and unemployment inertia 
as in Fuhrer and Moore (1995b), Batini and Haldane (1999), Smets 
(2003), and Woodford (2003).
5. Wicksell (1936 [1898] p. 189; emphasis in original). 
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The Phillips curve in this model (equation 1) relates inflation 
in quarter t to lagged inflation, expected future inflation, and 
expectations of the unemployment gap during the quarter, using 
retrospective estimates of the natural rate discussed below. The 
estimated parameter φ
π measures the importance of expected inflation 
for the determination of inflation. The unemployment equation 
(equation 2) relates unemployment in quarter t to the expected future 
unemployment rate, two lags of the unemployment rate, the natural 
rate of unemployment, and the lagged real interest rate gap. Here, two 
elements reflect forward-looking behavior: the estimated parameter φ
u, 
which measures the importance of expected unemployment, and the 
duration of the real interest rate, which serves as a summary of the 
influence of interest rates of various maturities on economic activity. We 
restrict the coefficient χ3 to equal 1 – φu – χ1 – χ2 so that the equation 
can be equivalently written in terms of the unemployment gap.
In estimating this model, we face the difficulty that expected 
inflation and unemployment are not directly observed. Instrumental 
variable and full-information maximum likelihood methods impose the 
restriction that the behavior of monetary policy and the formation of 
expectations be constant over time, neither of which appears tenable 
over the sample period that we consider (1969–2002). Instead, we 
follow the approach of Roberts (1997) and use survey data as proxies 
for expectations.6 In particular, we use the median forecasts from 
the Survey of Professional Forecasters from the prior quarter as the 
relevant expectations for determining inflation and unemployment 
in period t; that is, we assume expectations are based on information 
available at time t – 1. We also employ first-announced estimates of 
these series in our estimation, to match the inflation and unemployment 
data as well as possible with the forecasts. Our primary sources for 
these data are the Real-Time Dataset for Macroeconomists and the 
Survey of Professional Forecasters, both currently maintained by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (Zarnowitz and Braun, 1993; 
Croushore, 1993; Croushore and Stark, 2001). Using least squares over 
the sample 1969:1 to 2002:2, we obtain the following estimates:
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SER = 1.38; DW = 2.09.
6. See also Rudebusch (2002); Orphanides and Williams (2005c). 
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SER = 0.30; DW = 2.08.
The numbers in parentheses are the estimated standard errors 
of the corresponding regression coefficients; SER is the standard 
error of the regression and DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic. 
(Dashes are shown under the restricted parameters.) The estimated 
unemployment equation also includes a constant term (not shown) that 
captures the average premium of the one-year Treasury bill rate we 
use for estimation over the average of the federal funds rate, which 
corresponds to the natural interest rate estimates we employ in the 
model. For simplicity, we do not model the evolution of risk premiums. 
In the model simulations, we impose the expectations theory of the 
term structure, whereby the one-year rate equals the expected average 
of the federal funds rate over four quarters.
1.1 Natural Rates
We assume that the true processes governing natural rates in 
the economy follow highly persistent autoregressions. Specifically, 
we posit that the natural rates follow
u u u e t t u t
* * *
*, . . = + + − 0 01 0 99 1 , and
r r r e t t r t
* * *
*, . . = + + − 0 01 0 99 1 , 
where u
* and r
* denote the unconditional means of the natural rates 
of unemployment and interest, respectively. The assumption that 
these processes are stationary is justified by the finding, based on a 
standard augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, that one can reject the 
null hypothesis of nonstationarity of both the unemployment rate and 
the ex post real federal funds rate over 1950–2003 at the 5 percent 
level. To capture the assumed high persistence of these series, we set 
the first-order autoregressive, or AR(1), coefficient to 0.99 and then 
calibrate the innovation variances to be consistent with estimates of 
time variation in the natural rates in postwar U.S. data.
As discussed in Orphanides and Williams (2002), estimates of the 
variances of the innovations to the natural rates differ widely. Indeed, 
owing to the imprecision in estimates of these variances, the postwar 
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U.S. data do not provide clear guidance regarding these parameters. 
We therefore consider three alternative calibrations of these variances, 
which we index by s. The case of s = 0 corresponds to constant and known 
natural rates, where σ σ e e u r * * = = 0 . For the case of s = 1, we assume 
σeu* = 0.070 and  σer* = 0.085. These values imply an unconditional 
standard deviation of the natural rate of unemployment (interest) of 
0.50 (0.60), which is in the low end of the range of standard deviations 
of smoothed estimates of these natural rates suggested by various 
estimation methods (see Orphanides and Williams, 2002, for details). 
Finally, the case of s = 2 corresponds to the high end of the range of 
estimates; for this case we assume  σeu* = 0.140 and  σer* = 0.170. The 
relevant values of s for many small open economies and transitional 
economies may be even higher than estimates based on U.S. data, given 
the relative stability of the post-war U.S. economy.
1.2 Monetary Policy
We consider two classes of simple monetary policy rules. First, we 
analyze versions of the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993), where the level of 
the nominal interest rate is determined by the perceived natural rate of 
interest, ˆ
* rt , the inflation rate, and a measure of the level of the perceived 
unemployment gap (namely, the difference between the unemployment 
rate and the perceived natural rate of unemployment, ˆ
* ut):






t = + + − ( )+ − ( ) + + + ˆ ˆ
* * * π θ π π θ π ,                                     (5) 
where πdenotes the four-quarter average of the inflation rate, π* is the 
central bank’s inflation objective, j is the forecast horizon of inflation, 
and k is the forecast horizon of the unemployment rate forecast. We 
consider a range of values for the forecast horizons from –1, in which 
case policy responds to the latest observed data (for quarter t – 1), to 
a forecast horizon up to three years into the future. When policy is 
based on forecasts, we assume that the central bank uses the same 
forecasts of inflation and the unemployment rate that are available 
to private agents.
We refer to this class of rules as level rules because they relate 
the level of the interest rate to the level of the unemployment gap. 
Rules of this type have been found to perform quite well in terms 
of stabilizing economic fluctuations, at least when the natural rates 
of interest and unemployment are accurately measured. For our 
analysis, we consider a variant of the Taylor rule that responds to 
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the unemployment gap instead of the output gap, recognizing that the 
two are related by Okun’s (1962) law. In his 1993 exposition, Taylor 
examines response parameters equal to 0.5 for the inflation gap and 
the output gap, which, with an Okun’s coefficient of 2.0, corresponds 
to setting θπ = 0.5 and θu = –1.0.
If policy follows the level rule given by equation (5), then the 
policy error introduced in period t by natural rate misperceptions 
is given by
r r u u t t u t t  












   θ
. 
Although unintentional, these errors could subsequently induce 
undesirable fluctuations in the economy, worsening stabilization 
performance. The extent to which misperceptions regarding the 
natural rates translate into policy-induced fluctuations depends on the 
parameters of the policy rule. As is evident from the above expression, 
policies that are relatively unresponsive to real-time assessments of the 
unemployment gap—that is, those with small θu—minimize the impact 
of misperceptions regarding the natural unemployment rate.
As discussed in Orphanides and Williams (2002), one policy 
rule that is immune to natural rate mismeasurement of the kind 
considered here is a difference rule, in which the change in the nominal 
interest rate is determined by the inflation rate and the change in the 
unemployment rate:
∆ ∆ ∆ i u t t j
e
u t k = − ( )+ + + θ π π θ π
* .                                                           (6) 
This rule is closely related to price-level targeting strategies. It 
corresponds to the first difference of the rule that would be obtained 
if the price level were substituted for inflation in the level rule 
(equation 5).7 This policy rule is as simple, in terms of the number of 
parameters, as the original formulation of the Taylor rule. However, 
the difference rule is simpler to communicate and implement in 
practice than the Taylor rule because it does not require knowledge 
of the natural rates of interest or unemployment. Policy guided by 
a difference rule can thus be more transparent than policy guided 
by a level rule.
7. For related policy rule specifications, see Judd and Motley (1992); Fuhrer and 
Moore (1995a); Orphanides (2003a). See also Orphanides and Williams (2002, 2005b) 
for analyses of a generalization that nests the level rule (equation 5) and difference 
rule (equation 6). 
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2. PERPETUAL LEARNING
Expectations play a central role in determining inflation, the 
unemployment rate, and the interest rate in the model. We consider 
two alternative models of expectations formation. One model, used 
in most monetary policy research, is rational expectations, that is, 
expectations that are consistent with the model. The second model 
is one of perpetual learning, where agents continuously reestimate a 
forecasting model and form expectations using that model.
In the case of learning, we follow Orphanides and Williams (2005c) 
and posit that agents obtain forecasts for inflation, unemployment, 
and interest rates by estimating a restricted vector autoregression 
(VAR) corresponding to the reduced form of the rational expectations 
equilibrium with constant natural rates. We assume that this VAR is 
estimated recursively with constant-gain least squares.8 Each period, 
agents use the resulting VAR to construct one-step-ahead and multi-
step-ahead forecasts. This learning model can be justified in two ways. 
First, in practice agents are working with finite quantities of data, and 
the assumption of rational expectations only holds in the distant future 
when sufficient data have been collected. Alternatively, agents may allow 
for the possibility of structural change and therefore place less weight 
on older data, in which case learning is a never-ending process. 
Specifically, let Yt denote the 1 x 3 vector consisting of the 
inflation rate, the unemployment rate, and the federal funds rate, 
each measured at time t: Yt = (πt, ut, it). Let Xt be the j x 1 vector of 
a constant and lags of Yt that serve as regressors in the forecasting 
model. The precise number of lags of elements of Yt that appear in 
Xt depends on the policy rule. For example, consider the difference 
rule (equation 6) when policy responds to the three-quarter-ahead 
inflation forecast, j = 3, and the lagged change in the unemployment 
rate, k = -1. (This is one of the policies for which we present detailed 
simulation results later in the paper). In this case, two lags of the 
unemployment rate and one lag each of inflation and the interest rate 
suffice to capture the reduced-form dynamics under rational expectations 
with constant natural rates, so Xt = (1, πt–1, ut–1, ut–2, it–1)′. 
The recursive estimation can be described as follows: let ct be the 
j x 3 vector of coefficients of the forecasting model. Then, using data 
8. Sargent (1993, 1999) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) discuss properties of 
constant-gain learning. 
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through period t, the parameters for the constant-gain least squares 
forecasting model can be written as




1 κ , and                                                 (7)
R R X R t t t t t = + ′ − ( ) − − 1 1 κ X ,                                                               (8)
where κ > 0 is a small constant gain.
This algorithm estimates all parameters of the agent’s forecasting 
system and does not explicitly incorporate any information regarding 
the central bank’s numerical inflation objective. Later, we introduce 
this element of inflation targeting by positing that the announcement 
and explicit commitment to a quantitative inflation target simplifies 
the agent’s forecasting problem by reducing by one the number of 
parameters requiring estimation and updating.
A key parameter for the constant-gain-learning algorithm is the 
updating rate, κ. To calibrate the relevant range for this parameter, 
we examined how well different values of κ fit the expectations data 
from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, following Orphanides 
and Williams (2005c). To examine the fit of the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters (SPF), we generated a time series of forecasts using a 
recursively estimated VAR for the inflation rate, the unemployment 
rate, and the federal funds rate. In each quarter, we reestimated the 
model using all historical data available during that quarter (generally 
from 1948 through the most recent observation). We allowed for 
discounting of past observations by using geometrically declining 
weights. This procedure resulted in reasonably accurate forecasts of 
inflation and unemployment, with root mean squared errors (RMSE) 
comparable to the residual standard errors from the estimated 
structural equations (equations 3 and 4). We found that discounting 
past data with values for κ in the range of 0.01 to 0.04 yielded forecasts 
closer to the SPF, on average, than the forecasts obtained with lower 
or higher values of κ. Milani (2005) finds a similar range of values in 
an estimated dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium (DSGE) model 
with learning. In light of these results, we consider three alternative 
calibrations of the gain: κ = {0.01, 0.02, 0.03}, with κ = 0.02 serving as 
a baseline value.9 As in the case of natural rate variation, the relevant 
values of κ may be higher for small open economies and transitional 
9. The value κ = 0.02 is also in line with the discounting that Sheridan (2003) finds 
to best explain the inflation expectations data reported in the Livingston Survey. 
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economies than for the U.S. data, owing to the relative stability of the 
post-war U.S. economy.
Given this calibration of the model, this learning mechanism 
represents a relatively modest deviation from rational expectations 
and yields reasonable forecasts. Indeed, agents’ average forecasting 
performance in the model is close to the optimal forecast.
2.1 Central Bank Learning 
In the case of level rules, policymakers need a procedure to compute 
real-time estimates of the natural rates. If policymakers knew the true 
data-generating processes governing the evolution of natural rates, they 
could use this knowledge to design the optimal estimator. In practice, 
however, considerable uncertainty surrounds these processes, and the 
optimal estimator for one process may perform poorly if the process 
is misspecified. Williams (2005) shows that a simple constant-gain 
method to update natural rate estimates based on the observed rates 
of unemployment and (ex post) real interest rates is reasonably robust 
to natural rate model misspecification. We follow this approach and 
assume that policymakers update their estimates of natural rates using 
simple constant-gain estimators given by the following equations:
r r i r t t t t t   






   − − − − 1 1 1 1 0 005 π , and 
u u u u t t t t   






   − − − 1 1 1 0 005 .
3. EFFECTS OF IMPERFECT KNOWLEDGE ON ECONOMIC 
DYNAMICS
We first present some simple comparisons of the economy’s behavior 
under rational expectations with known natural rates and under 
learning with time-varying and unobservable natural rates. Under 
learning, the economy is governed by nonlinear dynamics, so we use 
numerical simulations to illustrate the properties of the model economy, 
conditional on the policymaker following a specific policy rule.
3.1 Simulation Methodology
In the case of rational expectations with constant and known 
natural rates, we compute all model moments and impulse responses 
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numerically as described in Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999). In all 
other cases, we compute approximations of the unconditional moments 
and impulse responses using simulations of the model.
For model stochastic simulations used to compute estimates of 
unconditional moments, the initial conditions for each simulation 
are given by the rational expectations equilibrium with known and 
constant natural rates. Specifically, all model variables are initialized 
to their steady-state values, assumed without loss of generality to 
be zero. The central bank’s initial perceived levels of the natural 
rates are set to their true values, likewise equal to zero. Finally, the 
initial values of the c and R matrices describing the private agents’ 
forecasting model are initialized to their respective values, which 
correspond to the reduced form of the rational equilibrium solution to 
the structural model assuming constant and known natural rates.
Each  period,  innovations  are  generated  from  Gaussian 
distributions, with variances reported above. The innovations are 
serially and contemporaneously uncorrelated. For each period, the 
structural model is simulated, the private agent’s forecasting model 
is updated (resulting in a new set of forecasts), and the central bank’s 
natural rate estimate is updated. To estimate model moments, we 
simulate the model for 41,000 periods and discard the first 1,000 
periods to mitigate the effects of initial conditions. We compute the 
unconditional moments from sample root mean squares from the 
remaining 40,000 periods (10,000 years) of simulation data.10
Private agents’ learning process injects a nonlinear structure into 
the model, which may generate explosive behavior in a stochastic 
simulation of sufficient length for some policy rules that would have 
been stable under rational expectations. One source of instability 
stems from the possibility that the forecasting model itself may 
become unstable. We take the view that private forecasters reject 
unstable models in practice. Each period of the simulation, we compute 
the maximum modulus root of the forecasting VAR excluding the 
constants. If the modulus of this root falls below the critical value of 
one, the forecasting model is updated as described above; if not, we 
assume that the forecasting model is not updated and the c and R 
matrices are held at their respective previous-period values.11
10. Simulations under rational expectations, in which we can compute the moments 
directly, indicate that this sample size is sufficient to yield very accurate estimates of 
the unconditional variances. Testing further indicates that 1,000 periods are sufficient 
to remove the effects of initial conditions on simulated second moments. 
11. We chose this critical value so that the test would have a small effect on model 
simulation behavior while eliminating explosive behavior in the forecasting model. 
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Stability of the forecasting model is not sufficient to ensure 
stability in all simulations. We therefore impose a second condition 
that restrains explosive behavior. In particular, if the inflation rate 
or the unemployment gap exceeds, in absolute value, five times its 
respective unconditional standard deviation (computed under the 
assumption of rational expectations and known and constant natural 
rates), then the variable that exceeds this bound is constrained to 
equal the corresponding limit in that period. These constraints on 
the model are sufficient to avoid explosive behavior for the exercises 
that we consider in this paper; they are rarely invoked for most of the 
policy rules we study, particularly for optimized policy rules.
For impulse responses, we first compute an approximation of 
the steady-state distribution of the model state vector by running a 
stochastic simulation of 100,000 periods. We then draw 1,001 sample 
state vectors from this distribution and compute the impulse response 
function for each of these draws. From these 1,001 impulse response 
functions, we compute an estimate of the distribution of the model 
impulse response functions.
3.2 Impulse Responses
We use model impulse responses to illustrate the effects of learning 
on macroeconomic dynamics. For this purpose, let monetary policy 
follow a level policy rule similar to that proposed by Taylor (1993), 
with θπ = 0.5 and θu = –1, where the inflation forecast horizon is three 
quarters ahead (j = 3) and that of the unemployment rate is the last 
observed quarter (that is, k = –1).
Figure 1 compares the impulse responses of inflation, the nominal 
interest rate, and the unemployment rate to one-standard-deviation 
shocks to inflation and unemployment under perfect knowledge 
(that is, rational expectations with known natural rates) with the 
corresponding impulse responses under imperfect knowledge with 
time variation in the natural rates, s = 1, and perpetual learning 
with gain κ = 0.02. Each period corresponds to one quarter. Under 
learning, the impulse responses to a specific shock vary with the 
state of the economy and the state of beliefs governing the formation 
of expectations. In other words, the responses vary with the initial 
conditions, {X, c, R}, at the time the shock occurs. To summarize the 
range of possible outcomes in the figure, we plot the median and the 70 
percent range of the distribution of impulse responses, corresponding 
to the stationary distribution of {X, c, R}. Under rational expectations, 
the responses are invariant to the state of the economy.
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under the Taylor Rulea 
  A. Inflation response  B. Inflation response
  to inflation shock  to unemployment shock
  C. Unemployment response  D. Unemployment response
  to inflation shock  to unemployment shock
  E. Interest rate response  F. Interest rate response
  to inflation shock  to unemployment shock
Source: Authors' computations.
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* * * . π π π 3 3 1 0 5 . The graphs display rational expectations with 
perfect knowledge (RE), and median and 70 percent range of outcomes under learning with s = 1 and κ = 0.02.
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The dynamic impulse responses to a specific shock exhibit 
considerable variation under learning. Furthermore, the distribution 
of responses is not symmetric around the impulse response that obtains 
under rational expectations. For example, the impulse responses of 
inflation and unemployment to an inflation shock are noticeably 
skewed in a direction that yields greater persistence. This persistence 
may be quite extreme with some probability, indicating that transitory 
shocks can have very long-lasting effects under learning.
3.3 Macroeconomic Variability and Persistence
Perpetual learning provides a powerful propagation mechanism 
for economic shocks in the economy, resulting in greater volatility 
and persistence. We present a summary comparison of the asymptotic 
variances and persistence for this experiment in table 1, which includes 
the full range of natural range variation and values of κ considered 
here. Learning on the part of the public increases the variability and 
persistence of key macroeconomic variables. Even in the absence of 
natural rate misperceptions (the case of s = 0), shocks to inflation and 
unemployment engender time variation in private agents’ estimates of 
the VAR used for forecasting. This time variation in the VAR coefficients 
adds persistent noise to the economy relative to the perfect-knowledge 
benchmark. As a result, the unconditional variances and the serial 
correlations of inflation, unemployment, and the interest rate rise under 
learning. These effects are larger for higher values of κ, for which the 
sensitivity of the VAR coefficients to incoming data is greater.
The presence of natural rate variation amplifies the effects of 
private sector learning on macroeconomic variability and persistence. 
Under rational expectations and the Taylor rule, time-varying natural 
rates and the associated misperceptions increase the variability 
of inflation, but have relatively little effect on the variability 
of the unemployment gap and interest rates. Nevertheless, the 
combination of private sector learning and natural rate variation (and 
misperceptions) can dramatically increase macroeconomic variability 
and persistence. For example, under the Taylor rule, the standard 
deviation of the unemployment gap rises from 0.87 percent under 
rational expectations with constant natural rates to 1.11 percent 
under learning with s = 1 and κ = 0.02. For inflation, the increase 
in the standard deviation is even more dramatic, from 2.93 percent 
to 4.35 percent. The first-order autocorrelation of the unemployment 
gap rises from 0.88 to 0.92 and that of inflation rises from 0.81 to 0.90. 
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The presence of natural rate variation and misperceptions interferes 
with the public’s ability to forecast inflation, unemployment, and 
interest rates accurately. These forecasting errors contribute to a 
worsening of macroeconomic performance.
3.4 Excess Sensitivity of Long-Horizon Expectations
The adaptive learning algorithm that economic agents employ to 
form expectations under imperfect knowledge in our model also allows 
us to investigate the behavior of long-horizon expectations. This allows 
examination of the apparent excess sensitivity of yields on long-run 
government bonds to shocks—a phenomenon that appears puzzling in 
standard models when knowledge is perfect. Shiller (1979) and Mankiw 
and Summers (1984) point out that long-term interest rates appear to 
move in the same direction following changes in short-term interest rates 
and to overreact relative to what would be expected if the expectations 
hypothesis held and expectations were assumed to be rational. Changes 
in the federal funds rate generally cause long-term interest rates to move 
considerably and in the same direction (Cook and Hahn, 1989, Roley 
and Sellon, 1995, Kuttner, 2001). Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a, 2001b), 
Cogley (2005), and Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) suggest that 
this sensitivity could be attributed to movements in long-run inflation 
expectations that differ from those implied by standard linear rational 
expectations macroeconomic models with fixed and known parameters.
Learning-induced expectations dynamics provide a potential 
explanation for these phenomena.12 Figure 2 shows the one-, two-, and 
ten-year-ahead forecasts of the inflation and nominal interest rates 
from the impulse response to a one-standard-deviation inflation shock, 
based on the same shocks used in computing figure 1; figure 3 shows 
the same for a one-standard-deviation shock to the unemployment 
rate. These measure the annualized quarterly inflation or interest rate 
expected to prevail n quarters in the future, not the average inflation 
or interest rate over the next n quarters. These forward rates are 
computed by projecting ahead using the agents’ forecasting model. 
Under perfect knowledge, inflation is expected to be only a few basis 
points above baseline two years after the shock, and expectations of 
inflation ten years in the future are nearly unmoved. The same pattern 
is seen in forward interest rates.
12. Orphanides and Williams (2005a) and Beechey (2004) analyze the reaction of 
the term structure of expectations to news in the presence of perpetual learning. 
05.Orphanides-Williams 77-124.indd 01/03/2007, 18:10 94Figure 2. Impulse Response to an Inflation Shock
under the Taylor Rulea 
  A. Inflation: One-year horizon  B. Interest: One-year horizon
  C. Inflation: Two-year horizon  D. Interest: Two-year horizon
  E. Inflation: Ten-year horizon  F. Interest: Ten-year horizon
Source: Authors' computations.
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* * * . π π π 3 3 1 0 5 . The graphs display rational expectations with 
perfect knowledge (RE), and median and 70 percent range of outcomes under learning with s = 1 and κ = 0.02.
05.Orphanides-Williams 77-124.indd 01/03/2007, 18:10 95Figure 3. Impulse Response to an Unemployment Shock 
under the Taylor Rulea 
  A. Inflation: One-year horizon  B. Interest: One-year horizon
  C. Inflation: Two-year horizon  D. Interest: Two-year horizon
  E. Inflation: Ten-year horizon  F. Interest: Ten-year horizon
Source: Authors' computations.
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* * * . π π π 3 3 1 0 5 . The graphs display rational expectations with 
perfect knowledge (RE), and median and 70 percent range of outcomes under learning with s = 1 and κ = 0.02.
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In contrast to the stability of longer-run expectations found under 
perfect knowledge, the median response under imperfect knowledge 
shows inflation and interest rate expectations at the two- and ten-year 
horizons rising by nearly ten basis points in response to a transitory 
inflation shock. Moreover, the excess sensitivity of longer-run inflation 
expectations to transitory shocks exhibited by the median response 
is on the lower end of the 70 percent range of impulse responses, 
indicating that the response of longer-run expectations is, on average, 
even larger and depends crucially on the conditions in which the 
shock occurs. Indeed, under unfavorable conditions, the inflation 
expectations process can become unmoored for an extended period. 
Such episodes correspond to endogenously generated “inflation scares” 
and are similar to historical episodes for the United States described 
in Goodfriend (1993). In these episodes, inflation expectations and 
long-term interest rates appear to react excessively and persistently to 
some event that would not warrant such a reaction if expectations were 
well anchored. These results also serve to highlight one of the crucial 
concerns regarding the behavior of expectations that the practice of 
inflation targeting attempts to address and that cannot appear in an 
environment of rational expectations with perfect knowledge. Under 
perfect conditions, expectations always remain well anchored.
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY POLICY DESIGN
This section explores the ways in which monetary policy can be 
improved in an environment of imperfect knowledge. We consider three 
issues, all of which are closely related key characteristics of inflation 
targeting. First, we compare the performance of the economy under 
the level policy rule framework and under the easier-to-communicate 
and more transparent difference policy framework. As we discuss, the 
difference rule strategy appears superior for ensuring achievement 
of the policymakers’ inflation objective, especially in an environment 
with uncertainty regarding natural rates—a situation in which 
level rules that rely on “gaps” from natural rate concepts for policy 
implementation run into substantial difficulties. Next, we consider the 
optimal horizon for expectations of inflation and unemployment rates 
to which policy reacts in the policy rule, as well as some robustness 
characteristics of policy under alternative preferences for inflation 
stabilization versus stabilization of real economic activity. Finally, 
we turn to the role of communicating an explicit numerical long-run 
inflation objective to the public for the performance of the economy 
under alternative policies.
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To facilitate comparisons, we compare the performance of the 
economy using a loss function as a summary statistic. Specifically, we 
assume that the policymakers’ objective is to minimize the weighted 
sum of the unconditional variances of inflation, the unemployment 
gap, and the change in the nominal federal funds rate:
L u u i = − ( )+ − ( )+ () 
 
 var var var
* * π π λ ν ∆ ,                                     (9) 
where var(x) denotes the unconditional variance of variable x. As 
a benchmark, we consider λ = 4 and ν = 1, but we also consider 
alternatives for the relative weight of real-activity stabilization, λ. (Note 
that λ = 4 = 22 corresponds to the case of equal weights on inflation and 
output gap variability—based on Okun’s law with a coefficient of 2.)
4.1 Comparing the Level and Difference Rule 
Approaches
Up to this point, we have assumed that policy follows a specific 
formulation of the Taylor rule. As emphasized in Orphanides and 
Williams (2002), such policies are particularly prone to making errors 
when there is considerable uncertainty regarding natural rates. In 
particular, persistent misperceptions of the natural unemployment 
or interest rates translate into persistent deviations of inflation from 
its target value. Perpetual learning on the part of economic agents 
amplifies the effect of such errors and further complicates the design of 
policy. It is thus instructive to also study alternative monetary policy 
rules that are robust to natural rate misperceptions and are therefore 
better designed for achieving medium-run inflation stability as in an 
inflation-targeting framework.
We start by examining more closely the performance of alternative 
parameterizations of the Taylor rule. Figure 4 presents iso-loss 
contours, curves that trace out the combinations of the policy rule 
parameters that yield an identical central bank loss, of the economy 
with the above loss function for alternative parameterizations of the 
level rule with j = 3 and k = –1: 






t = + + − ( )+ − ( ) + + −  
* * * π θ π π θ π 3 3 1 ,                                        (10) 
The top left panel shows the loss under rational expectations with 
constant natural rates, referred to in this discussion as perfect knowledge, 
while the other panels show the loss under learning with κ = 0.02 and 
time-varying natural rates for values of s = {0, 1, 2}. In each panel, the 
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horizontal axis shows the value of the inflation response, θπ, and the 
vertical axis shows the value of the unemployment response, θu. The 
contour charts are constructed by computing the loss for each pair of 
policy rule coefficients along a grid. The contour surface traces the losses 
corresponding to the values of these response coefficients. The coordinates 
corresponding to the minimum loss (marked with an x) identify the optimal 
parameters, among the set of values along the grid that we evaluated, 
for the underlying rule.13 Thus, from the top-left panel, the optimal level 
rule under perfect knowledge is given by:




t t = + + − ( )− − ( ) + + −  
* * * . . π π π 3 3 1 0 6 3 2 . 
Figure 4. Performance of the Level Rulea 
  A. Rational expectations  B. s = 0; κ = 0.02
  C. s = 1; κ = 0.02  D. s = 2; κ = 0.02
Source: Authors' computations.
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13. In constructing the loss contour charts, we only evaluate the losses along the 
points of the grid. Thus, the minima reported in the charts are approximate and do 
not correspond precisely to the true minimum values. In cases where the true optimal 
policy rule coefficients lie near the midpoint between two grid points, the true optimal 
policy will yield a loss that may be slightly lower than that reported in the chart, even 
after rounding to one decimal place. 
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The level rule optimized under the assumption of perfect knowledge 
is not robust to uncertainty regarding the formation of expectations or 
natural rate variation. Comparison of the two left panels, for example, 
indicates that if the optimal level policy under perfect knowledge were 
implemented when the economy is governed by s = 1 and κ = 0.02, the 
loss would be very high relative to the loss associated with the best 
policy under learning. (The same is true for the classic Taylor rule, with 
θπ = 0.5 and θu = –1.0.) One problem with the optimal level rule under 
perfect knowledge is that policymaker misperceptions of the natural 
rates of interest and unemployment translate into persistent overly 
expansionary or contractionary policy mistakes. In such circumstances, 
the policy rule’s rather timid response to inflation is insufficient to 
contain inflation expectations near the policymakers’ target. This 
is seen in the autocorrelation of inflation, shown in contour plots in 
figure 5. The combination of private sector learning and natural rate 
misperceptions yield an autocorrelation of inflation dangerously close to 
unity when the optimal policy under perfect knowledge is followed.
Figure 5. Autocorrelation of Inflation under the Level Rulea 
  A. Rational expectations  B. s = 0; κ = 0.02
  C. s = 1; κ = 0.02  D. s = 2; κ = 0.02
Source: Authors' computations.
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Level rules of this type entail a tradeoff between achieving optimal 
performance in one model specification and being robust to model 
misspecification. We have shown that the optimal rule under perfect 
knowledge is not robust to the presence of imperfect knowledge. For 
our benchmark case with imperfect knowledge, s = 1 and κ = 0.02, a 
rule with response coefficients close to θπ = 1.5 and θu = –1.5 would 
be best in this family. The greater responsiveness to inflation in this 
parameterization proves particularly helpful for improving economic 
stability here, but this policy performs noticeably worse if knowledge 
is, in fact, perfect.
Next we turn to the alternative policy that avoids gaps from 
natural concepts altogether. Figure 6 presents comparable iso-loss 
contours for the difference rule (equation 6) with j = 3 and k = –1:
i i u t t t
e
u t = + − ( )+ − + − 1 3 1 θ π π θ π
*
∆ ∆ .                                                     (11) 
The structure of this figure is comparable to figure 4, except that 
here, the vertical axis in each panel reflects the responsiveness to 
the change in unemployment, θ∆u. Comparing figure 6 with figure 4 
suggests that the difference rule generally yields superior performance, 
especially when knowledge is imperfect. Furthermore, in sharp 
contrast to the level rule optimized assuming perfect knowledge, the 
difference rule optimized assuming perfect knowledge appears to be 
robust to learning and natural rate variation. A difference rule with 
a response coefficient to inflation of about 1 and to the change in the 
unemployment rate of about –3 is nearly optimal under both perfect 
and imperfect knowledge. Indeed, the loss surface is relatively flat 
in the region of parameters close to this policy.14 By avoiding policy 
mistakes related to natural rate misperceptions, this rule keeps 
inflation—and thus inflation expectations—under tight control despite 
the presence of imperfect knowledge.
To demonstrate how the economy behaves under imperfect 
knowledge with a well-designed difference rule, figures 7, 8, and 9 
present impulse responses for the difference rule with θπ = 1 and 
θ∆u = –3. The three figures are directly comparable to the impulse 
14. In Orphanides and Williams (2006), we compute the optimal Bayesian policy 
assuming equal weights across the specifications of learning and natural rate variability 
considered here. We find that a difference rule with θπ = 1.1 and θ∆u = 2.6 is remarkably 
robust to uncertainty regarding the degree of imperfect knowledge. 
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responses for the Taylor rule shown earlier in figures 1, 2, and 3. 
These responses exhibit some overshooting and secondary cycling, 
as is typical of difference rules. The resulting loss, however, is 
significantly lower than that resulting under the level rules that 
may not exhibit such oscillations. In contrast to the impulse 
responses under the Taylor rule, the 70 percent range of impulse 
responses under the difference rule shown in these figures is much 
tighter and concentrated around the impulse response under perfect 
knowledge. This serves to demonstrate the relative usefulness of 
this strategy for mitigating the role of imperfect knowledge in the 
economy. In particular, figures 8 and 9 show that even without 
incorporating explicit information about the policymakers’ objective 
in the formation of expectations, this policy rule succeeds in 
anchoring long-horizon expectations, especially of inflation, under 
imperfect knowledge.
Figure 6. Performance of the Difference Rulea 
  A. Rational expectations  B. s = 0; κ = 0.02
  C. s = 1; κ = 0.02  D. s = 2; κ = 0.02
Source: Authors' computations.
a. The difference rule is defined as i i u t t t
e






  + − + − 1 3 1 θ π π θ π
*
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under the Difference Rulea 
  A. Inflation response  B. Inflation response
  to inflation shock  to unemployment shock
  C. Unemployment response  D. Unemployment response
  to inflation shock  to unemployment shock
  E. Interest rate response  F. Interest rate response
  to inflation shock  to unemployment shock
Source: Authors' computations.
a. The difference rule is defined as  i i u t t t
e






  − − + − 1 3 1 1 3 π π
* ∆ . The graphs display rational expectations with 
perfect knowledge (RE), and median and 70 percent range of outcomes under learning with s = 1 and κ = 0.02.
05.Orphanides-Williams 77-124.indd 01/03/2007, 18:11 103Figure 8. Impulse Response to an Inflation Shock under the 
Difference Rulea 
  A. Inflation: One-year horizon  B. Interest: One-year horizon
  C. Inflation: Two-year horizon  D. Interest: Two-year horizon
  E. Inflation: Ten-year horizon  F. Interest: Ten-year horizon
Source: Authors' computations.
a. The difference rule is defined as  i i u t t t
e
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perfect knowledge (RE), and median and 70 percent range of outcomes under learning with s = 1 and κ = 0.02.
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under the Difference Rulea 
  A. Inflation: One-year horizon  B. Interest: One-year horizon
  C. Inflation: Two-year horizon  D. Interest: Two-year horizon
  E. Inflation: Ten-year horizon  F. Interest: Ten-year horizon
Source: Authors' computations.
a. The difference rule is defined as  i i u t t t
e






  − − + − 1 3 1 1 3 π π
* ∆ . The graphs display rational expectations with 
perfect knowledge (RE), and median and 70 percent range of outcomes under learning with s = 1 and κ = 0.02.
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4.2 Forecast Horizons
Throughout the analysis so far, we have assumed that the policy 
rule responds to expected inflation at a three-quarter-ahead horizon 
and to the lagged unemployment rate or the lagged change in the 
unemployment rate. We also explicitly examine the choice of horizon 
for the class of difference rules. We find that under perfect knowledge, 
an outcome-based difference rule that responds to lagged inflation and 
unemployment performs about as well as forward-looking alternatives, 
consistent with the findings of Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2003). 
Under imperfect knowledge, however, an optimized difference rule 
that responds to the three-quarter horizon for expected inflation 
outperforms its outcome-based counterpart. As discussed in Orphanides 
and Williams (2005a), under learning, inflation expectations represent 
an important state variable for determining actual inflation that is not 
collinear with lagged inflation. Expected inflation can thus be a more 
useful summary statistic for inflation in terms of a policy rule.15
The inflation forecast horizon in the policy rule should not be 
too far in the future. Rules that respond to inflation expected two or 
more years ahead generally perform very poorly. Such rules are prone 
to generating indeterminacy, as discussed by Levin, Wieland, and 
Williams (2003). In contrast to inflation, the optimal horizon for the 
change in the unemployment rate is –1, meaning that policy should 
respond to the most recent observed change in unemployment (that 
is, for the previous quarter), as opposed to a forecast of the change in 
the unemployment rate in subsequent periods.
4.3 Alternative Preferences
Next, we explore the sensitivity of the simple policy rules we 
advocate as a benchmark for successful policy implementation to 
the assumed underlying policymaker preferences. In our benchmark 
parameterization, we examined preferences with a unit weight on 
inflation variability and a weight, λ = 4, on unemployment variability, 
noting that from Okun’s law this implies equal weights on inflation 
and output gap variability. As with various other aspects of the 
policy problem we examine, however, it is unrealistic to assume that 
15. Using a simpler model, Orphanides and Williams (2005a) show that with 
certain parameterizations of the loss function, it is best to respond to actual inflation, 
while in others, it pays to respond to expected inflation. A hybrid rule that responds to 
both actual and expected inflation outperforms either type of simple rule that responds 
to one or the other. 
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policymakers can have much confidence on the appropriate relative 
weights they should attach to inflation and employment stabilization 
in the economy from a public welfare perspective. It is therefore 
important to know whether a policy under consideration performs 
well across a range of reasonable alternative preferences. Indeed, 
robustness to such a range of preferences appears to be essential for 
successful implementation of inflation targeting in practice.
Figures 10 and 11 present the iso-loss contours of the benchmark 
difference rule with weights λ = 1 and λ = 8, respectively, comparable to 
that in figure 6 with λ = 4. The iso-loss contours associated with placing 
greater emphasis on price stability (figure 10) or employment stability 
(figure 11) suggest that policies derived based on our benchmark loss 
function would do rather well under either alternative. This speaks 
well for the robustness of our benchmark difference rules as guides for 
policy, as a robust policy guide ought to perform well across a range 
of reasonable alternative preferences.
Figure 10. Performance of the Difference Rule with Greater 
Emphasis on Inflation Stability (λ = 1)a 
  A. Rational expectations  B. s = 0; κ = 0.02
  C. s = 1; κ = 0.02  D. s = 2; κ = 0.02
Source: Authors' computations.
a. The difference rule is defined as i i u t t t
e
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4.4 Explicit Numerical Inflation Objective
The policy features we have described so far may be important not 
only for characterizing policy under inflation targeting, but also for 
characterizing policy for non-inflation-targeting central banks that 
may not have an explicit quantitative inflation target but still recognize 
the value of price stability and well-anchored inflation expectations 
for fostering overall economic stability. This section examines what is 
arguably the most important distinguishing characteristic of inflation 
targeting, relative to alternative policy frameworks—namely, the 
specification of an explicit numerical inflation objective.
As in Orphanides and Williams (2004, 2005a), we formalize this 
element of transparency by positing that the announcement of an 
explicit target is taken at face value by economic agents, who incorporate 
this information directly into their recursive forecasting algorithm. We 
implement the idea of a known numerical inflation target by modifying 
Figure 11. Performance of the Difference Rule with Greater 
Emphasis on Inflation Stability (λ = 8)a 
  A. Rational expectations  B. s = 0; κ = 0.02
  C. s = 1; κ = 0.02  D. s = 2; κ = 0.02
Source: Authors' computations.
a. The difference rule is defined as i i u t t t
e
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the learning model that agents use in forecasting to have the property 
that inflation asymptotically returns to target. No other changes are 
made to the model or the learning algorithm. In essence, with a known 
inflation target, agents need to estimate one fewer parameter in their 
forecasting model for inflation than they would need to do if they did 
not know the precise numerical value of the central bank’s inflation 
objective. More precisely, we assume that agents estimate reduced-form 
forecasting equations for the unemployment rate and the inflation rate, 
just as before. We then solve the resulting two-equation system for its 
steady-state values of the unemployment rate and the interest rate, 
assuming that the steady-state inflation rate equals its target value. 
We modify the forecasting equation for the interest rate by subtracting 
the steady-state values of each variable from the observed values on 
both sides of the equation and by eliminating the constant term. This 
equation is estimated using the constant-gain algorithm. The resulting 
three-equation system has the property that inflation asymptotically 
goes to target. This system is used for forecasting as before.
To trace the role of a known target in the economy under alternative 
policy rules, we compute impulse responses corresponding to the 
same policy rules examined earlier. Figure 12 shows the impulse 
responses to the inflation and unemployment shocks for the classic 
parameterization of the Taylor rule, assuming that the central bank 
has communicated its inflation objective to the public. Compared with 
figure 1, the responses of inflation under imperfect knowledge are more 
tightly centered around the responses under perfect knowledge. The 
differences are more noticeable when we examine long-run inflation 
expectations. Figures 13 and 14 show the impulse responses of longer-
run inflation and interest rate expectations, following the format of 
figures 2 and 3. The communication of an explicit numerical inflation 
objective yields a much tighter range of responses of longer-run 
inflation expectations, centered around the actual target. Absent here is 
the upward bias in the response of inflation expectations evident when 
agents do not know the target. Interestingly, although knowledge of the 
long-term inflation objective anchors long-term inflation expectations 
much better, it is unclear whether this translates to a much reduced 
sensitivity of forward interest rates to economic shocks.16
16. These comparisons, however, are based on the assumption that forecasts of 
these rates are governed by the same learning process governing the expectations for 
inflation and economic activity at shorter horizons that matter for the determination of 
economic outcomes in the model. If, instead, the long-horizon interest rate expectations 
embedded in financial markets reflect additional knowledge, it could result in smaller 
deviations from the perfect-knowledge benchmark than those presented here. 
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under the Taylor Rulea 
  A. Inflation response  B. Inflation response
  to inflation shock  to unemployment shock
  C. Unemployment response  D. Unemployment response
  to inflation shock  to unemployment shock
  E. Interest rate response  F. Interest rate response
  to inflation shock  to unemployment shock
Source: Authors' computations.
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* * * . π π π 3 3 1 0 5 . The graphs display rational expectations with 
perfect knowledge (RE), and median and 70 percent range of outcomes under learning with s = 1 and κ = 0.02.
05.Orphanides-Williams 77-124.indd 01/03/2007, 18:11 110Figure 13. Impulse Response to an Inflation Shock with 
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with Known π* under the Taylor Rulea 
  A. Inflation: One-year horizon  B. Interest: One-year horizon
  C. Inflation: Two-year horizon  D. Interest: Two-year horizon
  E. Inflation: Ten-year horizon  F. Interest: Ten-year horizon
Source: Authors' computations.
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Figures 15, 16, and 17 show the impulse responses corresponding 
to the difference rule specified as above and assuming the central 
bank has successfully communicated its objective to the public as 
described above. Short-run expectations tend to cluster around 
those that obtain under perfect knowledge. The median responses 
are remarkably close to those under rational expectations, and the 
70 percent ranges tend to be quite narrow, especially for inflation. 
Long-horizon inflation expectations are extremely stable under the 
difference rule coupled with an explicit numerical inflation objective. 
For instance, the behavior of ten-year-ahead inflation expectations 
is virtually indistinguishable from what would be expected under 
perfect knowledge. Forward interest rates, however, continue to show 
some small movements.
These impulse responses suggest that the expected benefits 
of announcing an explicit inflation target may be quite different 
depending on the policy rule in place. In terms of anchoring 
long-horizon inflation expectations, for example, the benefits of a 
known target seem considerably larger if policy follows the classic 
parameterization of the Taylor rule than if policy is based on a well-
designed difference rule. The extent of these benefits also depends 
on the precise degree of imperfections in the economy (that is, the 
learning rate, κ, and variation in natural rates, s, in our model). 
In the limiting case of rational expectations, for instance, the 
“announcement” of the policymakers’ target in our model does 
not make any difference at all, since agents already know the 
policymakers’ preferences and objectives, by assumption.
To provide a clearer picture of the stabilization benefits of a 
known inflation target in an environment of imperfect knowledge, 
we compare the performance of an economy with a known target 
to that with an unknown target for a given set of policies. Table 2 
presents this comparison when expectations are formed with our 
benchmark learning rate, κ = 0.02. In the top panel, we present the 
results for the classic Taylor rule with θπ = 0.5 and θu = –1.0, whose 
properties under learning without a known inflation target were 
examined in detail in section 3. In the middle panel, we present the 
results for the Taylor rule with θπ = 1.5 and θu = –1.5, which performs 
best within this family of level rules when κ= 0.02 and s = 1. In the 
bottom panel, we present comparable results for the difference rule 
with θπ = 1 and θ∆u = –3, which performs well even under learning 
with an unknown inflation target.
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  to inflation shock  to unemployment shock
  C. Unemployment response  D. Unemployment response
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  E. Interest rate response  F. Interest rate response
  to inflation shock  to unemployment shock
Source: Authors' computations.
a. The Taylor rule is defined as i i u t t t
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Known π* under the Difference Rulea 
  A. Inflation: One-year horizon  B. Interest: One-year horizon
  C. Inflation: Two-year horizon  D. Interest: Two-year horizon
  E. Inflation: Ten-year horizon  F. Interest: Ten-year horizon
Source: Authors' computations.
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with Known π* under the Difference Rulea 
  A. Inflation: One-year horizon  B. Interest: One-year horizon
  C. Inflation: Two-year horizon  D. Interest: Two-year horizon
  E. Inflation: Ten-year horizon  F. Interest: Ten-year horizon
Source: Authors' computations.
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The economy’s stabilization performance uniformly improves 
with a known inflation target under all three rules. Successful 
communication of an inflation target results in a modest reduction in 
the persistence of inflation. In addition, for each rule, the variability of 
inflation, real activity, and interest rates is smaller when the central 
bank successfully communicates its numerical inflation objective 
to the public. The extent of this improvement varies considerably, 
however. The gains of making the target known appear substantial 
under the classic Taylor rule. A more modest reduction in volatility is 
evident for the more aggressive level rule, while the gains associated 
with a known target are quite small when policy is based on the more 
robust difference rule. These results suggest that the improvement 
associated with successfully communicating a target can be rather 
small, compared with the improvement that could be expected 
from adopting the other elements of robust policies. For example, 
abandoning policy based on even the best parameterization of the 
level Taylor rule in favor of the robust difference rule yields a larger 
benefit than communicating a numerical inflation objective while 
continuing to follow a level rule.
5. CONCLUSION
Inflation targeting has been a very popular strategy among 
central banks, particularly in small open economies. Researchers 
have struggled, however, to pin down exactly what inflation targeting 
means in terms of an implementable policy rule. To some, the Taylor 
rule, or any monetary policy rule with a fixed long-run inflation 
target, is a form of inflation targeting; to others, inflation targeting 
is identified with solving a central bank optimization problem in a 
rational expectations model. One shortcoming of these approaches 
is that they abstract from the very cause that gave rise to inflation 
targeting in the first place: the loss of a nominal anchor that transpired 
under previous policy regimes in many countries.
This paper has attempted to put inflation-targeting strategy back 
into the context in which it was born— namely, one in which inflation 
expectations can endogenously drift away from the central bank’s goal. 
We assume that private agents and the central bank have imperfect 
knowledge of the economy; in particular, private agents attempt to 
infer the central bank’s goals and reactions through past actions. 
In such an environment, key characteristics of inflation targeting in 
practice—including transparency, a commitment to price stability, and 
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close attention to inflation expectations—can influence the evolution 
of inflation expectations and the economy’s behavior.
The problem of imperfect knowledge may be especially acute 
in small open economies and transition economies that have been 
drawn to inflation targeting. Many of these countries have undergone 
dramatic structural change over the past few decades. Consequently, 
conclusions regarding the characteristics of optimal monetary policy 
rules that are based on rational expectations models with perfect 
knowledge cannot provide trustworthy guidance. Our analysis 
suggests that policies formulated and communicated in terms of gaps 
from natural rate concepts that are fundamentally unknowable may 
be particularly problematic. A more reliable approach to successfully 
implementing inflation targeting is to search for monetary policy 
strategies that are robust to imperfect knowledge.
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